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Abstract During the past decades, the traditional state
monopoly in urban water management has been debated
heavily, resulting in different forms and degrees of private
sector involvement across the globe. Since the 1990s,
China has also started experiments with new modes of
urban water service management and governance in which
the private sector is involved. It is premature to conclude
whether the various forms of private sector involvement
will successfully overcome the major problems (capital
shortage, inefﬁcient operation, and service quality) in
China’s water sector. But at the same time, private sector
involvement in water provisioning and waste water treat-
ments seems to have become mainstream in transitional
China.
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Introduction
In the wake of the United Kingdom’s water privatization in
the 1980s, the 1990s witnessed the spreading of privati-
zation and a variety of public-private partnership (PPP)
constructions in developing countries, especially following
the promotion and push by international development
agencies such as the World Bank, the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and others (Nickson 1996, 1998; Kikeri and Kolo 2006). It
was believed that private sector participation in the water
sector would bring in much needed investment and
improve service coverage, quality, and efﬁciency by
replacing conventional public-sector systems suffering
from under-investment and inefﬁciencies due to excessive
political interference and rent-seeking behavior by vested
state and bureaucratic interests (Hall and others 2005).
During the past decades, a wide literature in economics,
governance, and public management has provided theo-
retical and empirical arguments and evidence in favor of
further private sector involvement in what used to be public
utilities. At the same time, however, debate continues on
the different partnership constructions, the division of tasks
and responsibilities between public and private sectors, and
the social effects coming along with these developments.
Topics, such as the relationships between ownership
(public or private) and efﬁciency (Vining and Boardman
1992; Spiller and Savedoff 1997; Birchall 2002; Afonso
and others 2005; Anwandter and Jr.Ozuna 2002; Hart
2003), the classiﬁcation of various public-private con-
structions and their characteristics (World Bank 2004;
Seppa ¨la ¨ and others 2001; US National Research Council
2002), the consequences of privatization for governmental
regulation (Nickson and Vargas 2002; Pongsiri 2002) and
questions of equity and equality are still heavily debated, in
particular with respect to the water sector and less so
regarding other utilities.
Although private sector participation in the water sector
is one of the more controversial topics in public utility
management today, this wave also spread to China at the
turn of the millennium, where the government started to
reform public sectors (water, electricity, roads, etc.) via
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reform expected to address the increase of several water
problems (water shortage, insufﬁcient infrastructure, water
pollution, etc.) to meet the requirement posed by acceler-
ated urbanization and high economic growth. As a late
comer in this ﬁeld of private sector involvement in the
provision of water services, China is able to learn from
numerous experiences of other countries, such as the
United Kingdom, France, United States, Chile, Philippines,
Mexico, Argentina, and Bolivia.
Since the earlier attempts of applying the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) approach in the water sector in the 1990s
and the full development of marketization reform in public
sectors in 2002, China has applied different models of
private sector involvement in over 300 water supply and
wastewater projects. This marketization reform emphasizes
the importance of the market, investment and ﬁnancial
liberalization, deregulation, decentralization, and a reduced
role of the state in the water sector (also see Robison and
Hewison 2005; Prasad 2006). Tariff reform with full-cost
recovery, competitive bidding procedures, changing own-
ership structures (e.g., public and private, Sino and
foreign), and restrictive ﬁscal policies are part of it.
This article reviews developments in private sector
involvement in China’s water management and assesses
whether expected results of marketization in the Chinese
water sector have been met: raising investment for infra-
structure, increasing service coverage and improved
efﬁciency in China’s water supply and wastewater treat-
ment. After interpreting further private sector involvement
in China’s urban water management in terms of modern-
izing water governance, this article provides a country-
wide overview of current privatization developments in the
Chinese water sector, and subsequently makes an in-depth
investigation in three distinct cases with respect to the new
roles and functions of the governments and private parties.
The ﬁnal section assesses the current status of privatization
programs in China’s water management and its implica-
tions of future research on water governance reform.
Private Sector Participation as Part of Modernizing
Urban Water Governance
In the debate on private sector participation in environ-
mental governance in general, and urban water governance
in particular, we can identify three — sometimes interre-
lated — discourses.
First, private sector participation goes back to the liter-
ature on state failure in the early 1980s. State failure refers
to the notion that the nation-state falls short in the provi-
sioning of collective goods, in this case environmental
services and quality. Some of the key publications in this
regard come from Germany. Martin Ja ¨nicke’s (1986) Sta-
atsversagen analyzed the fundamental inability of the
nation-state to protect the environment in the 1980s, and
called for an innovation or modernization of environmental
politics, later to be labeled political modernization (e.g.,
Tatenhove and others 2000; Mol 2002): a reorientation
towards a more preventive, pro-active and ﬂexible strategy
using new instruments and closer cooperation with and
participation of non-state actors. With a similar analysis of
the environmental state’s fundamental inabilities, Joseph
Huber (1985) came to slightly different solutions with his
strong plea for involving the private sector into environ-
mental services and protection. Finally, around the same
time Ulrich Beck (1986) formulated his Risk Society
hypothesis and identiﬁed subpolitical arrangements (i.e.,
arrangements for environmental protection and service
provision without and beyond the public state) as an
alternative for the conventional environmental politics of
the nation-state. Inspired by these and several other authors
and ideas, from the mid 1980s onward environmental
social science scholars started to develop ideas, investigate
practices, and formulate theories on governing environ-
mental problems, in which the environmental state was
given a less dominant and monopolistic position.
Around the same time (the second half of the 1980s)
ideas of further private participation and involvement in the
provisioning of environmental services (water, waste,
energy, etc.) started to develop, especially in the United
States and the United Kingdom. While also here the fun-
damental idea is involving the private sector in tasks
traditionally fulﬁlled by the public sector, the orientation
and literature is slightly different. The majority of the lit-
erature comes from the management and organization
sciences and the orientation is less focused on state failures
and governance, but rather on efﬁciency, the bringing in of
new capital and the introduction of market logics. The
dominant form of organizing urban infrastructure (water,
energy, waste, transport) by state agencies has been
replaced in many places by various PPP constructions, with
different reasons put forward to legitimate such new con-
structions (cf. Linder 1999). At the same time, these
partnerships led to considerable debate, most signiﬁcantly
on issues of equity and equality: who is involved in these
partnerships, for who are these constructions bringing more
effective and efﬁcient services, are local governments able
to balance the power of private capital coming in (espe-
cially in situations of Transnational Companies (TNCs) in
developing countries) (e.g., Oppenheim and MacGregor
2004), and what does private sector involvement mean for
affordability of environmental services for the poor?
Thirdly, in the 1990s, following the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (1992, Rio
de Janeiro), and even stronger after the Rio+10 conference
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123(2002, Johannesburg), ideas and practices of public private
partnerships started to emerge forcefully on the national
and global agenda (cf. Mol 2007). In this literature, the
emphasis is strongly on transnational partnering of public
and private entities, with a strong focus on the role of civil
society organizations. The main reason behind the recent
attention to private sector participation in environmental
protection and service delivery is related to tendencies of
globalization and governance complexities. As Davies
(2002) correctly summarizes, in this interpretation the
notion of partnership has a positive rhetoric referring to
inclusiveness, transparency, participation and dialogue,
redistribution of power, and equity. And not so much to
ideas of efﬁciencies, capital investment, market logics, and
increased service coverage.
In reviewing the arguments and legitimacy of the push
for private sector involvement in China’s urban water
governance, there is a strong relation to the second dis-
course on efﬁciency, capital investments and service
coverage, while ideas of state-failure and political mod-
ernization incidentally emerge. By the same token, the
Chinese discourse on private sector participation in urban
water management hardly draws upon ideas of wide cross-
sectoral partnerships and the positive logics of transpar-
ency, democracy, participation, and dialogue. Discussions
on China’s urban water governance reform argue for the
advantages of effectiveness and efﬁciency, and debate the
best organizational modes, division of responsibilities, and
coordination structures. Potential negative outcomes of
private sector participation — so strongly emerging in and
dominating western debates — are much less emphasized:
loss of decision-making autonomy of states and govern-
ments; unequal power relations and information
asymmetry in public-private partnerships; problems around
equity, access for the poor, participation and democracy in
decision-making (e.g., Hancock 1998; Poncelet 2001;
Miraftab 2004).
According to the World Bank, China, Chile and
Colombia are the only countries that remain active in water
privatization after 2001 (Izaguirre and Hunt 2005). How to
explain that, while the activities of water sector privatiza-
tion intend to shrink in an increasing number of countries
and international development agencies, such as the World
Bank, start to slow down such privatization programs,
China is actively promoting private sector involvement in
urban water governance?Two interdependent arguments
elucidate this. First, China’s urban water management
comes from a radically different starting position, where
market principles and logics were almost absent. Water
management was not just completely publicly organized
but also highly inefﬁcient, with large capital shortages,
poor coverage, no economic incentives and demand side
management, and highly centralized. This is a
fundamental, rather than marginal, difference with most of
the public utility systems in OECD countries before the
privatization discourses and practices of the 1980s and
1990s. Under such Chinese conditions, private sector
involvement in water management means more that just
handing water business over to for-proﬁt private compa-
nies. It most of all means building economic incentives and
logics, safeguarding enough ﬁnancial capital for infra-
structure investments, and widening the service area.
Second, private sector participation in China’s urban water
management is not just a matter of privatization. It is part
of a much wider and complex modernization program in
urban water governance, involving some of the critical
issues that emerged in the privatization debates in OECD
countries. The modernization of urban water governance
also includes (see OECD 2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c,
2005a, 2005b):
• water tariff reforms, where costs of drinking water
increasingly include full costs (also of wastewater
treatment), but come along with safeguards for low
income households to continue access to drinking
water;
• transparency, accountability and control of the
government;
• public participation in for instance water tariff setting,
complaint systems on water pollution and corruption,
public supervising committees on utility performance,
public and media debates on water governance, disclo-
sure of information to non-governmental actors (cf.
Zhong and Mol 2007); and
• decentralization of water tasks and responsibilities to
the local level.
In exploring the degree, nature, and forms of private sector
participation in China’s urban water governance in the
following sections; we have to leave these wider — related
— developments aside.
Privatization Policy in China’s Water Sector
In China, the term ‘‘private sector’’ has been regarded as
politically sensitive since 1949 when China started to
establish a socialist regime characterized by the nationali-
zation of ownership. The ﬁrst breakthrough of the
development of ‘‘private sector,’’ which was ofﬁcially
deﬁned as ‘‘economic organizations that aim at making
proﬁt, in which assets are privately owned and which have
eight or more employees’’ (Provisional Regulations of
Private Enterprises in PRC, the State Council, June 25 of
1988), took place mainly in competitive sectors in accor-
dance with the launch of China’s economic reform in the
late 1970s. The government remained in control of public
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management, and public transport. In the mid 1990s,
Chinese Government attempted to introduce the BOT
approach into the ﬁeld of urban infrastructures (thermal
power, hydropower, highway, water supply, etc.) via pro-
mulgating the Circular on Attracting Foreign Investment
through BOT Approach (No.89 Policy Paper of 1994, the
former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooper-
ation, January 16 of 1995) and the Circular on Major
Issues of Approval Administration of the Franchise Pilot
Projects with Foreign Investment (No.208 Policy Paper of
Foreign Investment, the former National Development and
Planning Commission, the Ministry of Electric Power
Industry, and the Ministry of Communications, 1995).
These two policy papers formed the ﬁrst legal ground for
private sector involvement and foreign capital investment
in Chinese urban infrastructure. Subsequently, the National
Development and Reform Commission ﬁrstly approved
three BOT infrastructure projects in 1996, including
Chengdu No.6 Water Supply BOT Plant (B), Guangxi
Laibin Power BOT Plant, and Changsha Wangcheng
Power BOT Plant (failed).
The earlier experiences of BOT projects brought in
needed capital and investment to develop China’s urban
water infrastructure. But it illustrated also many problems.
The issue of the ﬁxed investment return to investors was
one of these problems. After intensifying control over
foreign exchanges and loans in the late 1990s, the General
Ofﬁce of the State Council promulgated a speciﬁc circular
in 2002 to correct foreign investment projects with ﬁxed
investment returns, by modifying the relevant contract
terms, buying back all shares of foreign investors, trans-
ferring foreign investment into foreign loans, or
dismantling contracts with often severe losses.
The full-ﬂedged commitment of the Chinese govern-
ment to private involvement in the water and other utility
sectors dates from late 2002. In the December of 2002, the
Opinions on Accelerating the Marketization of Public
Utilities (No.272 Policy Paper of the MOC, 2002) started
the marketization reform of water and other public sectors
by opening public utilities to both foreign and domestic
investors: multi-ﬁnancing approaches, concession right and
concession management, pricing mechanism, reduction of
governmental monopolies and roles ended the traditional
policies of public utilities. The subsequent Measures on
Public Utilities Concession Management (No.126 Policy
Paper of the MOC, 2004; in this policy, ‘‘concession
management’’ refers to all forms of private sector partici-
pation.) of 2004 speciﬁes the procedure of how to involve
the private sectors in public utilities through awarding
concession right, but still relies heavily on BOT modes.
These steps proved more than just giving the private
sector a permission to enter public utilities. It is a complex
process involving among others ownership reforms,
redeﬁnition of the role of governments and operators,
restructuring the tariff mechanism, reforming governmen-
tal regulation, and designing public participation. In the
early years of marketization, the emphasis was especially
on market opening and ﬁnancing issues. With Opinions on
Strengthening Regulation of Public Utilities (No. 154
Policy Paper, the MOC, 2005) the neglect of governmental
regulation and the public good character of water in the
previous policy papers was corrected. This policy paper
emphasizes that the water sector provide basic public and
social goods and that the governmental regulation remains
essential (Fu and Zhong 2005). However, there is still a
lack of a systematic and comprehensive regulatory frame-
work for the Chinese urban water sectors in practice. The
MOC is attempting to introduce and develop a competitive
benchmarking system that might be helpful for further
regulation, but this is not yet in place. During the authors’
ﬁeld surveys, the local ofﬁcials of relevant water authori-
ties are laboring under the lack of effective measurements
for regulatory framework, have too much freedom of
(non)regulation, and have sometimes an incorrect percep-
tion of the government role as a regulator. Fu and
colleagues (2006) also refer to the fact that the government
has paid some attention to assets regulation while restruc-
turing ownership in the water sector, but neglected
regulating water service quality.
Compared to the exponential growth of water projects
with signiﬁcant private sector involvement, the legal basis
under privatization developed quite slow and is still
underdeveloped in China. Different from some water
privatization forerunner countries (e.g., England and
Wales, Philippines), which enacted speciﬁc laws before
entering into privatization, the marketization reform of and
private participation in the Chinese water sector is con-
ducted under various governmental policy papers, but
without specialized legislation. The current legal codiﬁca-
tion of public-private partnering in water services is largely
a reactive process, where various policy papers address
speciﬁc problems in the reform process due to the lack of a
well-established legal framework. Thus, much room for
improvement remains in the current legal basis, for
instance on further economic regulation, stronger legisla-
tive sanctions, and public participation (cf. Tong 2005;
Zhang 2006; Fu and Zhong 2005; Fu and others 2005).
As implementation problems were slowly or not ade-
quately addressed or resolved at the national level, local
governments started to issue local policy papers on speciﬁc
water projects. For instance, the Interim Provision on
Administrating Concession Right of Chengdu (No.131
Policy Paper of Chengdu Municipality, 2001) was issued
for implementing the BOT project of Chengdu No.6 Water
Supply Plant (B), which was the ﬁrst water BOT pilot
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Public Utilities Concession Management of Shenzhen
(No.124 Policy Paper of Shenzhen Municipality, 2003)
guided the reform of Shenzhen Water Group, the largest
water project with private sector involvement in China to
date.
The Current Landscape of Private Sector Involvement
In China’s water supply and wastewater services, four
major types of private corporations are active (Fu and
others 2006): (1) the water transnational corporations (e.g.,
VEOLIA and SUEZ); (2) Chinese investment developers
(e.g., Beijing Capital Group and Tianjin Capital Environ-
mental Protection Co. Ltd.); (3) liberalized water
companies (e.g., Shenzhen Water Group and Beijing
Sewerage Group); and (iv) environmental engineering
corporations (e.g., Beijing Sound Group and Tsinghua
Tongfang Water Engineering Corporation). In December
of 2004, the Ministry of Construction called provincial-
level authorities to summarize marketization of public
sectors (e.g., water and wastewater, solid waste, gas, and
public transportation). In July of 2005, a follow-up ﬁeld
survey was organized by the MOC, in which the authors
have participated. All reported data of this section come
from the reports of provincial-level authorities, supple-
mented by surveys of the Water Policy Research Center of
Tsinghua University (in which authors participated).
According to the MOC surveys, various forms of private
sector participation can be identiﬁed in both water supply
and waste water treatment: (1) commercialization of public
utilities: it is the transformation of a public agency/utility
into an independent corporation; (2) management contract
(or namely operations and maintenance contract): it refers
to a contractual arrangement in which a private operator
manages and maintains the service in a given period but
does not have investment obligations; (3) lease contract: it
is a short-term contract in which a private operator pays an
agreed-upon fee to the government for the right to manage
the facility; (4) Greenﬁeld contract (such as BOT, TOT,
BOOT, etc.): it means the government commits new
investment projects to a private company, within the con-
tract duration, the private operator manages the
infrastructure and the government purchases the water by a
contracted price (this price isn’t necessarily determined by
the actual water tariff); (5) concession contract: it is a long-
term contract in which a private operator bears responsi-
bilities for operations and maintenance and also assumes
investment and service obligations; (6) Joint Venture: it is
not a contract but, rather, an arrangement whereby a private
company forms a legal entity with the public sector, in
which both the private and the public parts share respon-
sibilities and (investment) obligations; and (7) full sale (or
full divesture): it is the sale of public assets to the private
sector. Table 1 summarizes the various forms of private
sector participation and their characteristics. Until July
2005, a total of 152 water supply projects and 200 waste-
water treatment projects involved private participation. The
total water production capacity of the 152 water supply
projects equaled about 17% of national water production
capacity of 2004. The treatment capacity of the 200
wastewater projects was over 30 million m
3 per day,
equaling 67% of the national total wastewater treatment
capacity of 2004.
Figure 1 shows the prevalence of different forms of
private sector participation in water supply and in waste-
water projects. The joint venture approach (including the
Sino-foreign joint ventures) has the largest share in the
water supply sector with 51% of the 152 privatized pro-
jects. The Greenﬁeld modes of private sector participation
(including the BOT and TOT contracts) dominated in the
wastewater sector, with 59% of the 200 projects. The
commercialization of governmental utilities also plays an
important role in both water supply (16% of 152 projects)
and wastewater (13% of 200 projects). The differences in
prevalence of private sector participation forms between
water supply and wastewater have a close relation with the
level of infrastructure development and with tariff levels.
Compared to urban water supply (with service coverage of
Table 1 Different forms of private sector participation in China’s water sector
Form of private sector participation Asset ownership Capital investment Operations & maintenance Contract period
Commercialization of governmental
enterprises/utilities
Public Public Public Indeﬁnite
Management contract Public Public Private 3–5yr
Lease contract Public Public Private 8–15yr
Greenﬁeld (BOT-type) Private/ public Private Private 20–30yr
Concession Public Private Private 25–30yr
Joint venture Shared Shared Shared Indeﬁnite
Sale or full divesture Private Private Private Indeﬁnite
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12388.8%), urban wastewater treatment lags behind, with a
service coverage of 45.6% in 2004 (MOC 2005). Direct
investment demand for urban wastewater infrastructure
(including wastewater treatment, sewers, and sludge treat-
ment) in China is expected to be over 30 billion US dollars
between 2006 and 2010, to meet the objective of 60%
municipal wastewater to be treated. Accordingly, local
governments prefer direct private sector investment in and
building of new wastewater infrastructure, resulting in high
levels of the Greenﬁeld modalities. In addition, the current
low wastewater treatment charges result in a preference for
Greenﬁeld modes. In these modes, ﬁnancing is based on
negotiated prices between the government and the private
sector and is less dependent to the user fee or charge;
drinking water supply costs are much better represented in
prices, making joint ventures more likely (Zhong and
others 2006).
Figure 2 categorizes public sector participation into ﬁve
groups, according to project capacity. The joint venture
approach leads the reform of water supply sector in all size-
categories, while the Greenﬁeld approach dominates in
wastewater sector, except for projects over 500,000 m
3 per
day. This might also be related to the different ﬁnancial
risks. Larger projects require much more direct capital
investment from the private sector, increasing the ﬁnancial
risk for private investors and moving, then, rather toward
joint venture approaches. Furthermore, the full sale/dives-
ture approach occurred more in the ﬁeld of water sector and
mainly in small projects in speciﬁc provinces (see Fig. 3).
And commercialization is more often found among larger
projects. This might be related to not only the larger capital
demands of bigger projects, but also huge labor redun-
dancies within such large projects. Existing large water
projects are traditionally run by state-owned enterprises
with high levels of superﬂuous workers. For private
investors it is often difﬁcult to improve efﬁciency, because
government contracts often do not allow ﬁring existing
workers following a commercialization process.
Figure 3 visualizes the provincial distribution of water
projects with private sector participation. At least 25
provinces have private sector participation experience in
water supply and 23 provinces in wastewater treatment.
The form of private sector participation is determined by
the level of development of water/wastewater infrastruc-
ture, as well as the local economic, social and political
conditions. With richer markets, more open economic
Fig. 1 Public sector participation in water: distribution over modal-
ities (2005)
Fig. 2 Distribution of private sector participation in water projects by
capacities
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southern coastal (e.g., Guangdong and Fujian) and the
eastern coastal (e.g., Jiangsu) provinces witnessed high
levels of reform in their water sector. Over 60% of foreign
private sector investment in water supply projects and
about 50% foreign private sector investment in wastewater
projects were implemented in these coastal regions,
according to the MOC survey. In the meanwhile, the ﬁrst
national BOT pilot project of Chengdu Water Supply
(Sichuan Province) has triggered a wave of private sector
participation in and around Sichuan Province (including
Chongqing and Yunnan). Furthermore, the special envi-
ronmental protection policies related to ‘‘The Three
Gorges’’ dam might have impelled private sector partici-
pation in wastewater sector of Sichuan Province and
Chongqing.
As shown in Fig. 3, in water supply the joint venture
approach dominates in 19 provinces. In the wastewater
sector, Greenﬁeld projects (including BOT and TOT)
dominate in 12 provinces. The commercialization of tra-
ditional state-owned water enterprises was adopted more
widely in inland provinces (such as Gansu, Heilongjiang,
Jilin, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yunnan) than in coastal provinces.
A joint venture approach for private sector involvement in
the wastewater sector was only adopted in provinces with
high wastewater treatment charges, such as Beijing, Fujian,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shanghai.
Three Case Studies of Public-Private Partnerships
The reported growing involvement of the private sector has
led to radical changes in China’s water management insti-
tutions. In this section, we report on ﬁeldwork of three case
studies with distinct modes of private sector involvement (a
joint venture, a concession, and a Greenﬁeld contract) to
analyze in detail the new institutions and relationships
between actors in these constructions. During ﬁeldwork in
Maanshan and Shanghai, we carried out face-to-face semi-
structured interviews with relevant local ofﬁcials (from the
construction authority, price authority, planning and reform
authority, state-owned assets administration authority, and
environmental protection bureau) and managers of water
service providers (water treatment plants/companies,
wastewater treatment plants/companies). In the perfor-
mance assessment project of Macau Water Company Ltd.,
the managers of relevant departments as well as the repre-
sentative of Macau Government were interviewed. In total,
around 30 interviews were held. While these three cases
represent different forms of private sector involvement,
they cannot be held representative. All three cases have
been assessed positively by the Chinese government and
independent researchers (see Fu and others 2006), making
them rather best practices than representative cases. But
together they illustrate the institutional transformations that
come along private sector involvement.
Joint Venture: Maanshan Water Supply
Maanshan City is an industrial, prefecture-level city of
1686 square kilometers, and a population of 1.24 million
(2004), of whom 46.8 per cent lives in urban areas.
According to the 2004 MOC statistics, 88.7 per cent of the
Fig. 3 Distribution of private sector participation in water projects by
provinces
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123urban population has access to water supply. Water
resources are abundant in Maanshan City due to its
advantageous location on the south bank of the Yangtze
River and abundant annual rainfall (1062–1092 mm).
Maanshan Construction Commission (MASCC) is not only
the competent authority for water supply and wastewater
treatment and as such, plays a leading role in the water
sector reform. It is also, as a so-called ‘‘Big Construction
Commission,’’ the main governmental agency responsible
for urban planning, construction, and management (cf Wu
2003).
In 2002, following the call of Central Government and
Anhui Provincial Government, MASCC embarked upon
marketization reform in water and other public utilities
(e.g., gas and public transport), widely inviting business
actors to become active and invest. The director of MAS-
CC, Mr. Xu, argued that changing the current water
institutions and increasing service quality were the most
important reasons and objectives for embarking on mark-
etization in the water sector in Maanshan, rather than
bringing in nongovernmental capital (personal communi-
cation 2004). Marketization was expected to impel and
accelerate the reform of converting the old Maanshan
Water Supply Company (MASWSC, established in 1958 as
state-owned and state-subsidized company with total assets
of 4.37 million RMB in 2002, ca. 0.528 million US$ at the
exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.277RMB) into a new institu-
tional lay-out. After negotiating with several private
companies, MASCC ﬁrst started — as a kind of trial — a
joint venture with Beijing Capital Group (BCG) for one
water supply plant (WTP, BCG owning 60% of shares).
This joint WTP sold puriﬁed water to MASWSC and
performed signiﬁcantly better than other WTPs managed
by MASWSC alone. In 2004, MASCC expanded the joint
venture cooperation with BCG to all WTPs of Maanshan
City, in which BCG obtained a 60% share by bringing in 90
million RMB (ca. 10.875 million US$ at the exchange rate
of 1US$ = 8.276RMB). The new joint venture company
(MAS-BCWLC) was awarded a 30-year concession right.
Both BCG (private sector) and MASWSC (public sector)
bear responsibility of investment, operation, and mainte-
nance of the WTPs (excluding the pipe networks) and
service obligations (see Fig. 4). With respect to the pipe
networks, MAS-BCWLC manages and maintains the
existing (pre-2004) network by signing a lease contract
with MASWSC, which remained owner of the assets and
bears the ﬁnancial obligations (debts). In the meanwhile,
MAS-BCWLC is requested to invest in new pipe infra-
structure in new development areas and in nonpiped
neighborhoods.
Within the new joint venture structure, the board of
MAS-BCWLC (4 members from BCG and 3 from WAS-
WSC) is the current decision-maker regarding planning
(within the objectives set by the municipal master plan-
ning), investment and ﬁnancing, partly replacing the
tradition of government decision structures. According to
the contract, the general manager of the joint venture
company comes alternately from MASWSC and BCG.
Taking into account the social dimensions of water provi-
sioning, the government claimed three key conditions in
the agreement with the concessionaire: ﬁrst, the conces-
sionaire (MAS-BCWLC) must ensure sufﬁcient and safe
water provision and the government can take over all
facilities without any indemnity if the concessionaire fails;
second, the concessionaire cannot change the public and
social nature of water and should include relevant social
responsibilities as governmental requirements (e.g.,
employing all personnel from the old water company,
providing free water for ﬁreﬁghting, reducing/subsidizing
water bills of the poor); third, the government controls the
water price.
In order to ensure high-quality water and service,
MASCC regulates the performance of MAS-BCWLC via
assessing annually the speciﬁed objectives approved by
Fig. 4 Organizational structure
of Maanshan water supply
system
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123both the MAS-BCWLC board and MASCC. For instance,
MAS-BCWLC was requested to achieve 12 key objectives
in 2004: (1) investment of 18 million RMB (ca. 2.175
million US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.276RMB);
(2) selling 48 million cubic meter water or more and
reclaiming[90% of water bills; (3) fulﬁlling indicators of
water service quality (for instance, [99% of the control
points should reach the required water quality standards;
[98% control points should reach standards for water
pressure; a maximum of 30% water loss; burst pipes repairs
within maximum time limits); (4) fulﬁlling all MASCC
indicators for safe work; (5) construction of the main body
of the No.4 WTP and 25 kilometer new pipes; (6) fulﬁlling
client service indicators (for instance, 100% good client
service; [90% public satisfaction); (7) fulﬁlling the
reconstruction of Xiangshan Town water supply system;
(8) elaboration and submitting a water supply plan;
(9) achieving the relevant objectives of National Civilized
City Assessment System (which was proposed by Central
Cultural and Ideological Building Commission in 2004; it
includes 119 indicators); (10) submitting water supply
plans to Municipal People’s Congress and Municipal
People’s Political Consultative Conference; (11) respond-
ing adequately to complaints and reporting this information
to the government; and (12) take anti-corruption measures.
After establishing the joint venture in 2002, the total
length of pipes and the volume of water provision have
increased (see Fig. 5) and MAS-BCWLC has been in
compliance with all requirements of the government,
according to interviews with local ofﬁcials. From 2004 to
2005, MAS-BCWLC has invested about 90 million RMB
(ca. 10.875 million US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ =
8.276RMB) for building new infrastructure, updating old
facilities and aged pipes, and establishing a customer ser-
vice system. In the meanwhile, the government has stopped
subsidizing WTPs after the involvement of BCG and the
joint venture even turned over about 18.7 million RMB (ca.
2.260 million US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ =
8.276RMB; including 2 million RMB of the rent fee for
pipe networks, 4.7 million RMB of dividends, 7.7 million
RMB of corporate income tax, 3 million RMB of value
added tax, and 1.3 million RMB of the expense of other
taxation; the total taxation of 12 million RMB is about 25%
of the total turnover of MAS-BCWLC in 2004) to the local
government in 2004. The improved service quality of water
provision not only satisﬁed the consumers, but also resulted
in government (and the price public hearing; cf. Zhong and
Mol 2007) support for the ﬁrst tariff reform after private
sector involvement in 2004. Maanshan Government
increased the water tariff from 0.83 to 1.08 RMB/m
3 (ca.
0.10 to 0.13 US$/m
3 at the exchange rate of 1US$ =
8.276RMB; rate for household consumers) and indirectly
subsidized MAS-BCWLC by moving the additional tax of
water provision (e.g., 0.05 RMB/m
3 for household con-
sumers) to the income of the joint venture water company.
In 2004, the per capita annual income of urban households
of Maanshan was 10,189 RMB (ca. 1231.15 US$ at the
exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.276RMB), of which around
1.16% was spent on water services (calculated based on
daily household water use of 300 liters per capita).
Obviously, the involvement of BCG has brought in
additional capital to develop Maanshan’s water supply
sector. But more importantly it has changed the institutional
structure, improved the water service quality and quantity,
as well as reduced the governmental input in this ﬁeld (see
Fig. 6). In this structure, the government beneﬁts both from
the taxations and dividends of the joint venture company,
while transferring part of the ﬁnancial, building, and oper-
ational risks to the private sector. Following this model of
Maanshan City, BCG has successfully expanded its activi-
ties to other cities, such as Huainan (Anhui Province), Baoji
(Shanxi Province), and Yuyao (Zhejiang Province).
However, this private sector involvement practice of
Maanshan is argued to have a (potential) political risk due
to the lack of a sound legal basis. In transitional China, in
particular, policies are perceived to be instable and insuf-
ﬁciently law-based. Until now, details on measures and
rules to regulate private utility companies are still missing
in current national and Anhui provincial policy papers
(Maanshan has no legislation right). This is a common
problem in Chinese marketization practices in the water
sector, as argued by many lawyers and academics. For
instance, Shenyang water supply has experienced several
failed marketization practices due to the constantly
changing policies and decisions of the local government
during 1995–2000 (ﬁeld survey 2004).
Concession Contract: Macau Water Supply
Macau is one of the two Special Administrative Regions of
China, together with Hong Kong. Administrated by Por-
tugal until 1999, it was the oldest European colony in
Fig. 5 Total length of pipes and annual water provision in Maanshan
(1995–2004)
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123China, dating back to the 16
th century. As a small territory
of 28 km
2 on the southern coast of China, consisting of a
peninsula and the islands of Taipa and Coloane, it has a
population of 508,000 (2006).
Macau has a long history in the private provision of
drinking water, since the earliest Macau Water Company
Ltd. (MWC) was founded in 1932 as a full private capital
company invested by individuals. Three years later, MWC
was taken over by a British Electricity Lighting Company
for 10 years and since 1946 by the president of the Macau
Economic Department and other individual shareholders.
Due to lack of capital and advanced technologies, Macau
had an inadequate water supply service with poor water
quality and discontinuous water provision during the
1970s. In 1985, Macau Government, learning from the
concession management practices in the French water
sector, awarded a consortium of two private companies,
NWS Holding Limits (Hong Kong) and SUEZ Environ-
ment (France), a 25-year concession contract. Macau
Government remained owner of the existing, pre-1985,
assets (plants and pipe networks), while the private Macau
Water Supply Ltd. (MWSL, the former MWC) bears
responsibilities for operations and maintenance of these
assets, as well as for new investments and service obliga-
tions (see Fig. 7). This concession contract is not only the
ﬁrst private sector participation construction in Chinese
water sector, but also the ﬁrst contract that seems to end
with a positive result.
Distinct from the previous private owners, who had little
experience in the ﬁeld of water provision, SUEZ (France)
brought in advanced water knowledge and technology.
According to the concession contract, MWSL must provide
high-quality water supply service, as well as bear several
obligations, such as planning, investment, construction,
operation, and maintenance of the infrastructure under the
supervision of Macao Government. In practice, Macau
Government has delegated tasks, responsibilities and
obligations to a very large degree to MWSL.
Fig. 6 Monetary ﬂow within
Maanshan water supply
Fig. 7 Organizational structure
in Macau water supply
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123Coming to the end of the 25-year concession contract,
MWSL hasfulﬁlledalmostalltermsoftheinitialcontract.It
has, among others, considerably improved water service
qualitybyincreasingserviceaccessandprovision,decreased
the loss of water leakage (see Fig. 8), and kept water tariff
(corrected for inﬂation) at a stable level (see Fig. 9).
In the concession contract, the government did not
specify conditions and safeguards for the poor. But in
practice, MWSL not only reduced the water bill for low-
income, disabled and other vulnerable groups. For instance,
MWSL has launched the ‘‘Elderly-In-Needs’’ water sub-
sidy program in 2001, which offers those aged over 55 free
water consumption of 5 m
3 per month. Since May 2005 the
‘‘Water for All’’ program offers free water consumption to
other categories of people in needs, such as single-parent
families and disabled. But also in addition, it built two
potable ‘‘Wallace fountains’’ (a special public fountain
with potable water) in Macau, providing free potable water
to tourists and citizens. MWSL has also been active in
various social welfare and charity activities, providing total
donations of 2.08 million MOP (1MOP = 0.965RMB,
2007; ca. 0.26 million US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ =
8.276RMB) during 2002–2005. During 1985–2005,
MSWL also charged discounted water tariffs for govern-
mental agencies, and handed in over 260 million MOP
(1MOP = 0.965RMB, 2007; ca. 32.56 million US$ at the
exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.276RMB) of taxes and about 56
million MOP (1MOP = 0.965RMB, 2007; ca. 7.012 million
US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.276RMB) of con-
cession fees to the government.
In both Maanshan and Macau, the water tariff is the
main ﬁnancial source for water companies, while govern-
mental subsidies have been abandoned. Accordingly,
whether the water tariff can cover the costs is signiﬁcant. In
the case of Macau, the Macau Government owns the pre-
concession infrastructure assets, which demands a smaller
ﬁrst investment from the Consortium. The water tariff
could easily cover the cost of operation and maintenance
(and not the huge capital costs of existing assets). Unlike
the joint venture construction in the Maanshan case, Macau
Government leaves all ﬁnancial responsibilities to the pri-
vate sector after the concession, and beneﬁts from taxes,
concession fees and discounts on government water bills
(see Fig. 10). Due to the limited initial investments of the
private consortium, sharp water tariff increases were
avoided after privatization (often one of the major reasons
for public resistance and failed private sector participation
in other countries). The local government still owns part of
the infrastructure assets, in particular the pipes system,
with huge sunk-costs.
Fig. 8 Annual water demand-
provision and water loss in
Macau (1982–2005)
Fig. 9 Water tariff rates of
Macau (1982–2005)
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123Macau is also an interesting case because of the unique
regulatory system, which includes the water quality regu-
lator (IACM), and a unique Government Delegate. IACM
is in charge of the water quality regulation, and monitors
and controls drinking water quality by random sampling
and analysis of over 70 water samples around Macau
everyday. The Government Delegate is not a government
ofﬁcial, but an individual working in another public utility
company and appointed by the government. Following
Macau laws, Mr. Lin Runzhong, the Government Delegate
for water supply, was appointed for a period of ﬁve years
by the Macau Government, and is not only the regulator of
MWSL, but also an important linkage between MWSL and
the government. He participates at all MWSL board
meetings and reports relevant information and documents
to the government. The Government Delegate decides
which information is considered relevant. He is also in
charge of assessing the performance of MWSL, and com-
ments on the ﬁve-year plans and tariff plans before MWSL
sends these to the government for approval. The Macau
government generally follows the comments and assess-
ments of the Government Delegate. In this sense, the
nongovernmental Government Delegate is deﬁned a spec-
iﬁed role and powerful position in governing the water
sector. This institutional arrangement relates to the small
size of Macau Government, where only a limited state
capacity (in quantitative and qualitative terms) is available
for numerous public tasks. In conclusion, it can be argued
that after 1985 the Macau government has played a meager
role in the drinking water management.
Greenﬁeld Contract: Shanghai Wastewater
The Greenﬁeld contract (e.g., BOT, TOT) is the dominant
form of private sector participation in wastewater sector
reform throughout the country. Shanghai Zhuyuan No.1
WWTP project is one of the most famous Greenﬁeld pro-
jects in China. It is presently one of the largest WWTP in
China, with a treatment capacity of 1.7 million m
3 per day
and an advanced primary treatment, serving an area of
107 km
2 and about 23.5 million inhabitants. But it also has
become famous for the lowest service price: 0.22 RMB (ca.
0.0266US$ at the exchange rate of 1US$ = 8.276RMB) per
cubic meter treated wastewater.
In 2002, the Youlian Consortium (consisting of Youlian
Development Company with 45% shares, Huajin Infor-
mation Investment Ltd. Company with 40% shares, and
Shanghai Urban Construction Group with 15% shares) won
the open tender for Zhuyuan No.1 WWTP project by bid-
ding the lowest treatment costs. A Project Company
(Shanghai Zhuyuan Youlian No.1 Wastewater Treatment
Ltd. CO.) was established and awarded a 20-year conces-
sion agreement by Shanghai Water Authority. A service
management contract was signed with Shanghai Sewerage
Company (a fully state-owned company administrated by
the government) including details of rights and obligations.
Two years later, Youlian Development Company withdrew
from this project by transferring the shares and obligations
to InterChina Holdings Group (see Fig. 11).
According to the agreement between Shanghai Water
Authority and the private company, Shanghai Water
Authority should minimize its interventions in the con-
struction, operation, and maintenance of WWTP and limit
them to safeguarding public health and safety. All condi-
tions and objectives with regard to water service quality are
deﬁned in the service contract between Shanghai Sewerage
Company and the private company. Among others, the
private company has to install an on-line monitoring sys-
tem and is requested to invite an authorized third party for
regular monitoring (on indicators such as BOD5, CODcr,
SS, NH4-N, and phosphate). This should be paid by the
private company, while reporting to the Shanghai Sewer-
age Company and should take place within ﬁve days.
Fig. 10 Monetary ﬂow within
Macau water supply
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123Shanghai Sewerage Company may conduct random water
examination at any time. According to the local ofﬁcials,
Shanghai Zhuyuan WWTP has fulﬁlled all responsibilities
and obligations required by the contract up till now,
including meeting the water quality standards.
In the case of Shanghai Zhuyuan Greenﬁeld project, the
government has transferred its traditional responsibilities
of investment, construction, operation, and maintenance
(for the contract period) to the private Project Company,
accompanied by paying a service fee (see Fig. 12). Dif-
ferent from the joint venture construction in Maanshan and
the concession construction in Macau, in which corporate
proﬁts directly depend on the water tariff, the private
operator within a Greenﬁeld contract is paid a service price
negotiated between the government and the private sector.
This service price depends on the investments and agreed
performance levels, rather than on the user fee level, and
which provides the private sector with the ﬁnancial risks.
Accordingly, the low service price of Zhuyuan No.1
WWTP (which was 42% less than the projected costs by
government) presented in the public bidding, was argued to
have a close relation to earlier governmental input in this
project. Shanghai Water Assets Management Development
CO. Ltd., a fully public-owned company, was in charge of
the pre-phase design and invested about 30 million US
dollars in the ﬁxed infrastructure of this project, while the
government provided the land free of charge to the oper-
ator. Strictly speaking, Shanghai Zhuyuan No.1 WWTP
Greenﬁeld project is a quasi-BOT project, due to the fact
that part of the investment comes from the government.
The experience of Shanghai is an example of full gov-
ernmental delegation of the daily management of WWTP
to the private sector, while ﬁnancial support via subsidies
and preferential policies (e.g., land use) facilitate privati-
zation with low service prices. It is, however, too early to
fully assess the success of this project. Some BOT WWTP
projects in other cities have met problems following gaps
in the current national policy documents. For instance,
projects in Foshan (Guangdong Province) could not run
properly due to conﬂicts over current land use right. And
projects in Beijing were delayed during the ﬁnancing
process because the domestic private actors met difﬁculties
in obtaining loans from domestic banks due to the lack of a
sound loan policy. The commercial banks couldn’t provide
long-term loans as required for BOT-types projects as their
credit policies are restricted for the private sector (Zhong
and Fu 2005), while the China Development Bank can
provide long-term loans for BOT-types projects only for a
limited number of clients (Chang and others 2006).
Conclusions
With the emergence and blossoming of various forms of
private sector involvement in the Chinese water sector, the
traditional structure of full governmental provision of
water supply and wastewater treatment has changed dra-
matically. The analysis in this article has provided
evidence of the contribution of these new modes to
increased capital investment, and especially of more efﬁ-
cient operations and improved service provision. In that
sense, the original goals of the Chinese government to
embark upon private sector involvement in water provi-
sioning and treatment have been met. However, the early
stage that most contracts are in, and the not yet crystallized
forms and modes of privatization, prevents us from draw-
ing any ﬁnal conclusions on the impact of private sector
involvement in the Chinese water sector.
Fig. 11 Private sector
involvement in Shanghai
wastewater treatment
Fig. 12 Monetary ﬂow within Zhuyuan Greenﬁeld project
Environmental Management (2008) 41:863–877 875
123From the three casestudy projects with private sector
participation, we can draw some lessons for how to suc-
cessfully involve the private sector into the provision of
water services. Firstly, a balance between the water tariff
level, proﬁts of investor and governmental subsidies is
required. As Hall and Lobina (2005) state, most practices
of water privatization fail due to public resistance follow-
ing sharp price increases and job losses. In China, this has
not (yet) been the case, due to large increases in efﬁcien-
cies and governmental support to ﬁxed infrastructure
assets, reducing ﬁnancial risk of the private sector and
limiting the need for large water tariff increases. At the
same time, the signiﬁcant economic growth levels enables
local residents to cope with some tariff increases, the poor
and disadvantaged have been subsidized by the govern-
ment, job losses have been minimized following social
policies, and public hearings have contributed to higher
levels of legitimacy. This all contributed strongly to a
relatively smooth transformation of China’s water sector.
Secondly, the selection of the PPP form has a close
relation with the level of local water tariff. As illustrated by
this article, Greenﬁeld projects appear to be applied when
tariffs are not sufﬁcient, especially in the wastewater sector
(see also Zhong and others 2006), while Joint Venture
approaches are often used in cities with sufﬁciently high
water tariff, in particularly in the water supply sector.
Thirdly, it is crucial to accelerate the establishment of
systematic and comprehensive governmental regulatory
framework, as the current ad hoc, fragmented and diverse
regulatory system endangers efﬁciency in water service
development and certainty and stability for foreign inves-
tors. Experiences in many countries have proven that
regulation is a key aspect in successful privatization in the
water sector and a competitive benchmarking system is
regarded as useful in an effective regulatory approach. In
late 2006, the MOC attempted to develop a Chinese water
supply benchmarking system, which is still ongoing.
However, the current private sector involvements in the
Chinese water sector still face many legal and regulatory
uncertainties. Too often local authorities experiment with
systems of governmental regulation and control, or — as in
Macau — seem to become marginalized. According to
interviews with local ofﬁcials during our ﬁeldwork, the
importance of establishing a workable regulatory and legal
system is essential. Guaranteeing sufﬁcient and safe water
service to the public is jeopardized by the fact that gov-
ernments can no longer fully control the planning,
operation, and management of water services as before
private sector participation. This might only be signs of
uneasiness with the new water institutions and division of
tasks and responsibilities, but can also be the heralds of an
emerging debate on privatization in the Chinese water
sector.
Finally, but not least, it is important to identify the
differences in risk allocations in the water (service) market
between the public and private sectors within different
modes of PPP. As Table 1 and the three case-study projects
illuminate, with the various forms of privatization, the
government often transfers (smaller or larger parts of)
ﬁnancial risks, building risks, and operation and mainte-
nance risks to the private sector. Meanwhile, in the end the
government can always take over all facilities without
paying an indemnity to the private sector if a concession-
aire fails in obtaining the goals as formulated by
governmental authorities, or some conﬂicts emerge in the
further policies (e.g., the terminated contracts that are
regarded as providing the private sector a ﬁxed investment
return). In that sense, the still unstable legal base in tran-
sitional China provides a major political and transfer risk
for private investors.
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